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After the deregulation of the airline industry in the 1980s and 1990s, airlines competed based 
on two distinct business models, the low-cost carrier and full-service carrier model. Today, a 
clear differentiation between the two business models is no longer possible, as airlines have 
departed from these traditional models. Although this convergence trend is gaining increasing 
attention in literature, its impact on airline profitability remains mostly unstudied. To fill this 
gap, I develop a framework to measure and clearly distinguish between the business models. 
Using data on 10 low-cost carriers from the United States and Europe in the period from 2007 
to 2016, I assess the effect of business model changes on profitability and further highlight the 
business model convergence trend. I find that the convergence of business models in the airline 
industry is evident, despite the fact that quite often adhering to the traditional low-cost business 
model proves to be beneficial in several aspects. In some cases, however, departing from the 
original model can also lead to a performance increase. 
 
 





Após o período de desregulação da indústria de aviação nas décadas de 80 e 90, as companhias 
aéreas competiram com base em 2 diferentes tipos de modelos de negócio, o modelo de 
transportadora low-cost e o de transportadora de serviço completo. Hoje em dia, já não é 
possível fazer uma clara distinção entre os dois modelos, uma vez que as transportadoras se 
afastaram destes modelos tradicionais. Apesar da tendência para a convergência ter ganho 
relevância na literatura, o seu impacto na rentabilidade do sector aéreo continua, em grande 
parte, por ser estudado. Para colmatar esta lacuna, desenvolvo um sistema para medir e 
claramente fazer a distinção entre os modelos de negócio. Usando dados de 10 transportadoras 
low-cost dos Estados Unidos e da Europa no período de 2007 a 2016, avalio o efeito que as 
diferenças de modelos de negócio têm na rentabilidade e realço a tendência de convergência 
em modelos de negócio. Observo que a convergência de modelos de negócio na indústria de 
aviação é evidente, apesar de que aderir ao modelo tradicional low-cost prova, frequentemente, 
ser benéfico em vários aspetos. Em alguns casos, no entanto, afastar-se do modelo original pode 
também levar a um aumento da performance. 
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The passenger airline industry was historically dominated by a single business model, the 
full-service carrier (FSC) model. After the deregulation of the industry in the 1970s in the 
United States (US) and later in the 1980s in Europe, the first low-cost carriers (LCCs) disrupted 
the industry (Diaconu, 2012; Graham & Shaw, 2008). Whereas FSCs offered much more than 
just transportation from A to B, LCCs built their business purely on this transportation aspect, 
eliminating frills such as on-board entertainment, complimentary meals and free checked 
baggage (Belobaba et al., 2016). Over the years, the LCC business model became increasingly 
popular across the world. While LCCs steadily expand their market share and the aviation 
market gains importance in general, a business model convergence trend has become 
noticeable. Increasingly, airlines blend attributes of the two competing business models 
together (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). For example, the LCCs EasyJet, Ryanair, Vueling and 
Norwegian recently joined the airline alliance “Airlines for Europe”, which is atypical for LCCs 
(Airlines for Europe, 2018). Norwegian further entered the long-haul market, and the LCC 
JetBlue introduced its new MINT business class (JetBlue, 2018; Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 
2013). Contrary to these changes, FSCs are increasingly taking on low-cost business model 
characteristics, by introducing checked baggage fees and reducing their overall in-flight service 
levels, as initially only done by LCCs (Vidović et al., 2013). Motivations for this behavior range 
from adapting to a changing market environment to increasing competition and imitation 
strategies (Hvass, 2008; Mason et al., 2011). Consequently, to sustain a competitive advantage, 
airline management needs to be wary of the business model hybridization and correspondingly 
adapt their business model or engage in business model innovation (Daft & Albers, 2013, 2015). 
The field of business model convergence in the airline industry is becoming a more 
frequently discussed topic. While the subject finds increasing attention among scholars and 
practitioners, there is yet no sufficient analysis on how business model changes impact airline 
performance (Daft & Albers, 2015). Two opposing views on how business model changes 
affect airlines’ profitability exist (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; Hvass, 2012). One study argues 
that LCCs that take on aspects similar to FSCs are at risk of losing profitability by giving up 
their cost advantage (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). Furthermore, it can be argued that if the 
majority of airlines change towards a similar hybrid business model, overall airline profitability 
could potentially decrease due to the risk of creating a homogenous market environment. This 
new environment could then be disrupted again, such as the way it was by LCCs after the airline 
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market liberalization (Daft & Albers, 2015). On the contrary, Hvass (2012) argues that it is 
beneficial to blend specifications of both the traditional LCC and FSC model. Most importantly, 
airline managers could benefit from further analysis of the effect of business model changes on 
airline performance (Daft & Albers, 2015). Based on these two opposing views and the current 
market development, I address the following research question: Is it beneficial for LCCs to 
change their business model specifications in light of the recent convergence trend?  
In the following sections, I present an empirical approach to investigate the outlined 
research question. After reviewing extant literature, I separate the two business models and then 
derive a new business model framework by synthesizing the general and airline-specific 
literature on business models. The constructed framework serves as the foundation for the data 
collection on 10 LCCs from Europe and the US between 2007 and 2016. To investigate the 
impact of business model changes on airlines’ profitability, I develop two fixed effect 
regression models that highlight the effect of business model changes on both airline revenue 
and operating margin. To complete the research, I then outline and further analyze the airlines’ 
business model changes to emphasize the recent convergence trend.  
The results of the research show that the hybridization of business models in the industry 
is evident. I further find that airlines’ business model changes have a significant effect on their 
performance. The impact is noticeable in both directions, when moving towards the more 
traditional LCC model, as well as when eliminating some of the traditional specifications 
commonly used by FSCs. The most significant positive impact on airline profitability is found 
in operating a single-class cabin and not engaging in cargo operations. An adverse effect on 
profitability is shown when not offering complimentary in-flight entertainment, and not being 
part of the Global Distribution System (GDS).  
The thesis is structured in the following way. In chapter 2, I present an extensive literature 
review, including a general and industry-specific overview of business models and strategy. In 
this chapter, I further outline prior research about airline business model hybridization and 
industry convergence, as well as include a short overview of the industry market development. 
Subsequently, in chapter 3, I describe the derived business model framework, the data sample 
and the methodology used. Chapter 4 illustrates the convergence trend, analyzes the results of 
the regression models and provides further discussion. Chapter 5 describes the limitations of 
this study and concludes the thesis.   
 
 3 
2 Literature Review and Airline Industry Overview 
This chapter is segmented into three distinct parts. First, an in-depth literature review 
provides a comprehensive theoretical background of the business model (BM) and business 
model innovation (BMI) concepts. Based on extant research, I further distinguish between the 
terms BM and strategy. The chapter subsequently elaborates on the idea of BMI, before finally 
applying the concepts to the airline industry and providing a brief industry overview. 
2.1 General Business Model Framework 
Existing literature defines three broader areas in which scholars frequently categorize BMs 
(Wirtz et al., 2016). In the organization-oriented view, the BM represents the architecture or 
structure of the company (Al-Debei et al., 2008; Zott & Amit, 2007). The technology-oriented 
view recognizes technology as the core component of a BM, and consequently reduces the 
relevance of other aspects of the firm’s BM (Eriksson & Penker, 2000). Recent developments 
show that scholars in the area of technology orientation see the BM as an increasingly holistic 
representation of the company (Wirtz et al., 2016; Zott et al., 2011). Lastly, the strategy-
oriented view shows the integration of strategy into a BM (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Hamel, 2001). Contradictory to the notion of introducing strategy into the BM concept, scholars 
have gradually tried to separate the terms BM and strategy (Al-Debei et al., 2008; Amit & Zott, 
2001; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010). The BM definition by Teece (2010) combines 
essential factors from the three aforementioned areas and does not restrict the separation of the 
terms BM and strategy. In the author’s words, a business model “defines how the enterprise 
creates and delivers value to customers, and then converts payments received to profits” (Teece, 
2010, p. 173).  
Numerous definitions of a BM exist in relevant literature. Scholars agree that there is 
hitherto no generally accepted view regarding the usage and definition of a BM (Al-Debei et 
al., 2008; Osterwalder et al., 2005; M. Porter, 2001; Teece, 2010). In 2016, the definition of a 
BM remained indistinct; though views in this field have been slowly aligning over the past 
years (Wirtz et al., 2016; Zott et al., 2011).  
As outlined above, existing literature also shows inconsistency regarding the distinct 
components and contents of a BM. Wirtz et al. (2016) identified nine influencing components 
of a BM based on reviewing prior literature. Teece (2018) defined three principal components 
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based on studies by Osterwalder (2005) and Schön (2012). The three components consist of the 
Value Proposition with the subcategories Product & Service, Customer Needs, and Geography; 
the Revenue Model, which includes Pricing Logic, Channels, and Customer Interaction; and the 
Cost Model, which overarches Core Assets & Capabilities, Core Activities and Partner 
Network. Wirtz et al. (2016) point out that the purpose of BMs is rarely stated in literature. As 
a general conclusion, a BM aims at promoting an understanding of the entire company as well 
as the continuous development of the BM itself, while assuring the creation of a sustainable 
competitive advantage.  
2.2 Separating Business Model and Strategy 
Within the discussion about the typology and characteristics of a BM, the separation of the 
term BM from the term strategy is gaining increasing attention. Wirtz et al. (2016) state that 
many scholars over the last decade focused on clearly delimiting the term strategy from the BM 
concept. Although the two terms do intersect, they are not the same, which has been described 
by Al-Debei et al. (2008), Amit et al. (2001), Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2010) and 
Osterwalder (2004). Thus, the terms are often misapplied (Magretta, 2002). In their effort to 
separate the terms BM and strategy, Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2010) consider a BM as the 
logic of the firm, which describes the way the company operates and creates value for the 
stakeholders (see figure 1.). This is aligned with the definition by Teece (2010), in which 
customers are referred to as the principal stakeholders, as well as with the general understanding 
of a business model’s increasing focus on value creation instead of value capture (Zott et al., 
2011).  
Although various views on what constitutes strategy exist in literature, according to 
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart (2010), the term strategy refers to a set of different strategies the 
firm can choose from. This set is also referred to as a contingent plan. Outlining and executing 
a strategy is a preceding task, which then results in the selection of a distinct BM, to successfully 
achieve the mission of the firm (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Dahan et al., 2010). A 
firm’s implemented and therefore realized strategy subsequently aims at explaining the explicit 
choice of BM that the firm selected to compete in the market. Similarly, a widely accepted view 
by Porter (1996, p. 64) defines strategy as “...deliberately choosing a different set of activities 
to deliver a unique mix of value”. As characterized by Porter (1985) firms can either adopt a 
differentiation or a cost leadership strategy. In their granular approach towards describing BMs, 




than traditional product or process innovation over time. Research further suggests that BMI 
supports gaining a sustainable competitive advantage, typically through radical innovation 
rather than incremental or continuous change (Voelpel et al., 2004). Firms increasingly see BMI 
as a way of competing, and therefore as a potential source of gaining a competitive advantage 
(Markides & Charitou, 2004; Zott et al., 2011). For example, even though companies such as 
Dell or Southwest Airlines were not directly involved in technological innovation, by 
recombining different organizational and distribution systems, they created a new source of 
competitive advantage (Teece, 2010). Literature further suggests that BMI can potentially 
disrupt established competitors (Markides, 2006). Sustaining a competitive advantage poses an 
increasingly challenging task in today’s complex and fast-changing business environment 
(Economou & Chatzikonstantinou, 2009).  
A further salient point of BMI is the cognitive ability of managers to understand the 
potential value benefit resulting from changing specifications of the old BM or switching to a 
new model (Chesbrough, 2010). Teece (2010) also states that certain barriers against changing 
the BM exist, as it can be seen as a paradigm change to the entire firm. Independent of its 
success and degree of innovation, a BM is furthermore always exposed to specific market 
threats, such as imitation and commoditization (Tucker, 2001). It is therefore crucial to generate 
a sophisticated interaction between different BM components in order to make it more difficult 
for competitors to imitate (Porter & Siggelkow, 2000).  
2.4 Business Models in the Airline Industry  
Four different airline types based on distinct BMs exist within the airline industry: FSCs, 
LCCs, regional airlines and charter airlines (Doganis, 2006; Hunter, 2006; Lawton, 2002). This 
thesis focuses on LCCs, including a brief description of FSCs to exemplify BM convergence; 
however, it omits regional airlines and charter airlines entirely. 
Pacific Southwest Airlines was the first to introduce the low-cost airline BM, which was 
later copied by Southwest Airlines in 1971. Today the LCC model is one of the most prevalent 
within the airline industry (Diaconu, 2012) and will hereafter be referred to as the traditional 
LCC business model The Airline Deregulation Act, which was signed into law in the US in 
1978, opened the previously protected industry to new competition. Southwest Airlines quickly 
gained market share. New airlines then started populating the space, competing with the 
incumbents by offering a different approach to air travel (Diaconu, 2012; Pels, 2008). A similar 
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legislation change by the European Union (EU) to promote trade between 1988 and 1997 
opened the entire route market within the region to all airlines. This opening evidentially led to 
the gradual increase of LCCs within the industry (Graham & Shaw, 2008). Over the years, the 
traditional low-cost model evolved to a static BM, outlining a well-defined and coherent set of 
choices and offering the potential for superior business performance (Demil & Lecocq, 2010).  
FSCs enjoyed a dominant position in the aviation market for many decades. They, 
however, failed to prepare for a deregulated market and the rapid adoption of the LCC model 
(Franke, 2007). Whereas the FSC business model focuses on a differentiation strategy; the LCC 
BM adopts a cost leadership strategy (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; M. E. Porter, 1985). The 
operation cost of the average LCC is 51% lower compared to that of FSCs (Doganis, 2006). 
LCCs achieve a cost advantage by focusing on two main operational aspects: a higher seating 
density and higher aircraft utilization. LCCs typically operate a single-class cabin aircraft with 
a seat pitch of 71-74cm, whereas FSCs’ mixed-class aircraft have an average seat pitch of 79-
81cm. LCCs therefore have on average a higher seating density. By targeting secondary airports 
with point-to-point flights rather than utilizing a hub-and-spoke network, LCCs can turnaround 
airplanes faster and achieve a higher aircraft utilization rate. LCCs further save costs by not 
transporting cargo nor including complimentary in-flight services. In 2003, the daily utilized 
hours per Boeing 737-300 for the LCC EasyJet were at 10.3h compared to 6.9h for the FSC 
British Airways (Doganis, 2006). Table 1 provides a short overview of the major differences 
between FSCs and LCCs. A detailed description of the individual BM specifications will follow 
in section 3.4. 
Table 1: Comparison of FSC and LCC Business Model (Source: adapted from Hunter 
(2006)) 
Characteristics Full-service Carrier Low-cost Carrier 
Strategy Differentiation Cost minimization 
Scale Large Smaller, but also major players 
(Ryanair, EasyJet, Southwest) 
Business Model 
specifications 
Hub-and-spoke (network) system; short-, 
medium-, and long-haul routes; multiple 
aircraft types; low utilization; tickets sold 
through third parties; complimentary 
catering and in-flight entertainment 
Point-to-point flights; short sector 
length; fleet uniformity; high 
utilization; short turnaround time; 
direct ticket sales; charge for catering 
and in-flight entertainment 
Market & 
Competition 
Competing with other FSCs (based on 
service quality) and increasingly with LCCs 
Focusing on low-cost travel sector, 




2.5 Business Model Innovation and Convergence in the Airline Industry 
The increasing competition within the airline industry caused by the rapid expansion of 
LCCs with low airfares threatened the FSC BM. Consequently, FSCs were forced to adjust 
their BM to stay competitive (Vidović et al., 2013). Some FSCs went as far as competing 
through the establishment of LCC subsidiaries (Gillen & Gados, 2009). Singapore Airlines 
successfully launched the LCC subsidiary Silk Air in 1989 (Markides & Charitou, 2004). 
However, multiple failures such as those of Delta Airlines and Continental Airlines to copy the 
traditional BM (Porter & Siggelkow, 2000) illustrate the challenge in moving towards a dual 
BM (Markides & Charitou, 2004). As Santos et al. (2009) discuss, FSCs that were trying to 
integrate a low-cost subsidiary failed due to their inability to understand the complex interaction 
of activities and the cost minimization aspect, thus not generating profits. Most of these 
examples describe failures; nonetheless, experimenting with new configurations of BM aspects 
is essential for BMI. Only by doing so, is the company able to collect relevant data and get 
ahead of its competitors, and eventually develop the capabilities necessary for BMI 
(Chesbrough, 2010).  
As outlined above, the LCC BM was static for a long time, delivering a cost advantage 
based on a well-chosen combination of activities. The static BM was challenged by FSCs 
progressively trying to adopt LCC BM specifications, thereby eroding the LCCs profitability 
(Demil & Lecocq, 2010). During the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008 - 2009, a decline in 
revenues and low profitability further led LCCs and FSCs to adapt their BM to current market 
conditions, which consequently resulted in the emergence of hybrid BMs (Vidović et al., 2013). 
A hybrid model is classified as taking on aspects of both the traditional LCC and FSC model 
(Klophaus et al., 2012). As Hvass (2008) points out, BMI in the airline industry is comprised 
of two possibilities: through innovation (proactive) or imitation (reactive). The latter often 
describes a firm’s defensive tit-for-tat strategy to protect the airline against competitors’ 
changes. An example of the reactive approach is Southwest’s adoption of a frequent-flyer 
program (FFP) in response to LCC competitors introducing such loyalty programs in order to 
retain customers (Peterson, 2004). By executing a proactive approach, such as through 
technological innovation, more often a new source of competitive advantage can be established 
(Teece, 2010). Several changes in the past years among airline BMs led to the emergence of 
hybrid BMs. On the one hand, LCCs adopted higher service levels as seen in the FSC BM. The 
most common examples include offering transfer flights based on codeshare agreements with 
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partner airlines, using the GDS, offering complimentary catering and in-flight entertainment, 
as well as offering FFPs (Klophaus et al., 2012; Vidović et al., 2013). A report by Sabre Airline 
Solutions (2010) further states that LCCs are increasingly taking on hybrid BMs by 
experimenting with long-haul routes, new services, and partnerships. On the other hand, FSCs 
abandoned free in-flight entertainment and complimentary catering on distinct routes, added 
increased flexibility to airfares and started selling tickets directly on their websites (Štimac et 
al., 2012).  
Although the field of airline BMs hybridization is not thoroughly researched yet, scholars 
agree that the traditional LCC model is outdated. LCCs changed parts of their BMs to sustain 
their cost advantage and adjust to a changing market environment, as examined in various 
studies. An overview of prior research in the field of BM convergence is shown in appendix I.  
Scholars in the field of LCCs suggest a new categorization for the model. According to 
Vidović et al. (2013), only Ryanair still holds on to the traditional (pure) LCC model. Whereas 
low-cost airlines such as Wizz Air adhere to more than 80% of the traditional aspects and are 
therefore still considered real LCCs, EasyJet already evolved towards a hybrid LCC model and 
airlines such as Norwegian and FlyBe are categorized as hybrid FSCs. Lastly, Air Berlin is 
classified as a FSC, as the airline only holds on to 30% or less of the traditional LCC aspects. I 
will later use these new classifications of LCCs to describe the airlines in the data sample and 
illustrate my findings on the convergence trend. Literature consequently suggests that further 
research should be conducted to assess how BM changes impact an airline’s profitability (Daft 
& Albers, 2013, 2015). In an earlier study by Alamdari & Fagan (2005), the authors conclude 
that by adhering to the traditional LCC BM, airlines could potentially ensure greater 
profitability. Growing similarity among airlines, however, could cause an environment which 
could be easily disrupted by a new model and thereby erode profitability of the incumbents 
(Daft & Albers, 2015). While Ryanair, with its ultra-low-cost model, adheres to the traditional 
LCC model and remains one of the most profitable airlines in Europe, the self-proclaimed 
hybrid carrier Air Berlin recently filed for bankruptcy (Airberlin, 2018; Daft & Albers, 2015). 
Practitioners, as well as scholars, continuously raise suspicion about the airline hybridization 
development, even though empirical evidence for the ongoing convergence in the airline 





In the following chapter, I outline the empirical approach followed in this thesis. First, I 
derive an airline-specific BM framework by synthesizing general and industry-related literature 
on BMs. The developed framework serves as the foundation for operationalizing variables and 
collecting relevant data. Subsequently, I will describe the dataset and its dependent, 
independent and control variables. Lastly, I outline the longitudinal research setting and the 
fixed effects regression models that were used to find empirical evidence to answer the research 
question. 
3.1 Business Model Framework and Variable Operationalization 
To operationalize the variables included in this study, I compile a BM framework following 
an approach similar to Soyk et al. (2017). The process is briefly described in this section and 
outlined in greater detail in appendix II. I use the BM and BM component definition by Teece 
(2010, 2018) to methodically explain and describe the particular activity set and organizational 
design of any company, irrespective of the industry context. The general concept is then 
compared to the two leading generic airline BM definitions by Daft & Albers (2015) and Mason 
& Morrison (2008). This method allows for the distinct separation between BM and strategy. 
Subsequently, I choose the airline BM definition by Daft & Albers (2015) because its 
dimensions (or components) provide a better fit to the components of the industry-unspecific 
BM framework. The BM components outlined by Daft & Albers (2015) are further described 
using 36 items. A detailed explanation of all these components is done in the study by Daft & 
Albers (2015) and is therefore not described here. Due to the limited publicly accessible data 
within the industry, it is not possible to collect data on all components and items. Access to 
paid databases is also not feasible within the scope of this thesis. As such, in order to derive a 
suitable BM framework, the BM components defined by Daft & Albers (2015) function as a 
general guideline. The distinct BM specifications (or items) of LCCs and FSCs defined by 
Belobaba et al. (2016) and Hunter (2006) are then attributed to the components. The resulting 
framework with its 14 items and three main components serves as the foundation for the 
variables chosen (see table 2 in section 3.4). 
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3.2 Data Collection and Sample  
The sample in this longitudinal research setting comprises data of 10 LCCs from Europe 
and the US between 2007 and 2016. Similar to the research of Alamdari & Fagan (2005) and 
Hvass (2012) a deciding factor for this study was that the data is publicly available on the 
internet. Data collection within the airline industry is challenging for many reasons. Due to 
different reporting standards across countries, it is difficult to acquire the same operational and 
managerial data for all airlines. Initially, for better comparability, I planned on investigating 
only LCCs headquartered in the European market. However, as many airlines are part of a 
holding group, data in annual reports is mostly aggregated and cannot be distinctly allocated to 
the different business units1 (Daft & Albers, 2013). Consequently, I focus on LCCs in Europe 
and North America, because of similar growth rates and market maturity (as shown in section 
2.6). The comparable level of deregulation in the US and Europe further indicate a similar 
environment for potential BMI, in contrast to other less developed markets such as Asia. The 
decision to select both European and American-based LCCs hence facilitates the analysis.  
With the recent convergence trend, another potential issue is the BM classification of LCCs 
and FSCs. As already stated, throughout literature, multiple classifications of airlines and their 
respective BMs exist. To be consistent when choosing the airlines for the data sample and to 
eliminate a potential self-selection bias (Wooldridge, 2013), I follow the airline classification 
of governmental bodies in the US (Bureau of Transportation Statistics) and Germany (German 
Aerospace Center). Based on the 20 largest LCCs in Europe (German Aerospace Center, 2017), 
I then investigate which airlines are most suitable for the data sample following the reasoning 
outlined above. In the European market, six of the 20 leading LCCs offer enough publicly 
available data. Therefore, I select the following airlines: Ryanair, EasyJet, 
Norwegian/Norwegian International (combined, hereafter referred to as Norwegian), Vueling, 
Wizz Air, and Flybe. I further choose four US low-cost carriers following the same approach: 
Southwest Airlines, Spirit Airlines, JetBlue and Allegiant Air (United States Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, 2018).  
The dataset is compiled based on information from the airlines’ annual reports, SEC Filings 
of the 10-K Form, the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, the UK Civil Aviation Authority, 
airline websites, flight statistics websites and various press releases. It was only possible to 
                                                      
1 For example, Lufthansa group with its business units Lufthansa Passage, Germanwings, Swiss, etc. 
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assess the required data from 10 airlines, thus restricting the depth of the study. To obtain a 
sizeable sample, I collect data for the last 10 years based on the most recent annual report or 
SEC 10-K filing available (2016). Different fiscal year periods for European and American 
airlines aggravate the comparison of data. Depending on the fiscal year of the distinct airline2, 
I select annual reports from different years for the first year (2006/2007) and the last year 
(2015/2016) to minimize this effect. To collect data on the 14 specifications outlined in the BM 
framework, I primarily utilize the airline’s annual reports and supporting press releases3. 
Additionally, I collect data on different financial aspects, such as operating revenue, operating 
profit, and costs. Further, I gather data on operational characteristics, such as fleet size, the 
number of employees, revenue passenger kilometers and available passenger kilometers, and 
passengers carried, amongst others. All financial (monetary) data is transformed into real 2010 
values with the consumer price index (CPI) (World Bank, 2018). Further, I convert all monetary 
values to Euro (€) with the average exchange rate of the domestic currency (based on the 
airline’s headquarters) for each year. All operational data with imperial length units was further 
converted to the metric system. The final dataset used in the models shows no missing values, 
representing a complete dataset. 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
To investigate whether it is beneficial for a LCC to change its BM, it is essential first to 
determine indicators of airline success. Throughout literature, various measures of airline BM 
success exist, such as net profit, operating profit, market share, or customer satisfaction 
(Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; Hvass, 2012). Performance indicators, such as the operating margin, 
are further used to describe the success of an airline (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005; Mason & 
Morrison, 2008). This thesis proposes two dependent variables, the operating revenue and the 
operating margin. Thus, I can first analyze the impact of the distinct BM specifications on 
operating revenue and compare it with the estimated effect on the operating margin. To follow 
a normal distribution, the operating revenue is transformed with the natural logarithm. The 
variable is displayed as “log(op_rev)”. The operating margin is calculated in the following way 
and is represented as “op_margin”. 
                                                      
2 Depending on the airline, fiscal years start between January 1st, April 1st and October 1st. 
3 Some of the press releases and official company statements regarding Wizz Air were translated from 







The variable operating margin elicits a challenge, as the highly volatile fuel cost is included 
in the calculation of the Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT). As described in the study by 
Hvass (2012) these price fluctuations potentially mask successful BMs. It is however not 
possible to find financial data which did not account for the cost of fuel for all airlines in the 
data sample.  
3.4 Independent Variables 
As I am interested in measuring the impact a change in BM specifications has on LCC 
performance and highlight the BM convergence, I collect information on the 14 items of the 
previously defined LCC BM framework. Table 2 provides an overview of the independent 
variables. A detailed description follows in the text below.  
Table 2: Variable Operationalization Results (Source: author’s own contribution) 
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and improved their complimentary in-flight services. Norwegian, for example, offers free Wi-
Fi on almost all of its European flights and more recently also on trips to the US and the 
Caribbean, after introducing its long-haul service (Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA, 2018). 
Contrary to this trend, FSCs are increasingly trying to reduce their service costs by partly 
adopting a no-frills system (Belobaba et al., 2016). 
4. No_cargo. Whereas cargo transportation can contribute to airline revenues, loading and 
off-loading have a negative impact on the cost optimization aspect of LCCs (Gillen & Gados, 
2009). The freight activities adversely influence the short turnaround times of airplanes which 
leads to a lower aircraft utilization (Doganis, 2006). Moreover, also in the LCC long-haul 
business, scholars in the field argue that cargo operations could have a negative impact on 
business performance (Soyk et al., 2017) despite significantly increasing revenues 
(McKinsey&Company, 2013). Most LCCs hence do not engage in cargo operations. Contrary 
to that, Daft & Albers (2013) outline that three out of four airlines in their study changed from 
not carrying freight to introducing cargo operations between 2003 and 2010. 
5. Sing_class. A single-class cabin means that there is no differentiation between classes 
in the traditional LCC model. By operating an all-economy class, airlines have a higher seat 
density, which reduces the operating cost per passenger (Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). Herein, the 
convergence trend is also noticeable. While the LCC JetBlue introduced its business class on 
selected routes (JetBlue, 2018), FSCs such as Lufthansa outsourced part of its route network to 
its LCC subsidiary Germanwings, thereby commencing business class service on these routes 
(Daft & Albers, 2015). 
6. Short_haul. According to Eurocontrol (2011), flights with stage lengths longer than 
4000km4 are considered long-haul flights. In this thesis, all flights shorter than 4000km are 
categorized as short-haul flights. To serve both short-haul and long-haul markets, different 
aircraft types are more efficient (Belobaba et al., 2016). However, this is not in alignment with 
the cost minimization strategy of LCCs as outlined in the description of the variable “fleet_uni”. 
As a result, LCCs typically only operate short-haul fleets. In the data sample, only Norwegian 
started to offer long-haul flights. However, the industry is changing, as an increasing number 
                                                      




of LCCs, such as Eurowings, Westjet and WoW Air, recently started operating long-haul flights 
(Soyk et al., 2017).  
7. Low_fare. Cheap one-way fares are based on the no-frills concept, network system and 
general cost minimization aspect of LCCs, which have been described before. 
8. Bag_fees. Also in alignment with the LCC no-frills system, LCCs charge a fee for 
checked baggage. This ancillary revenue contributes to LCCs’ ability to offer low-cost fares 
(Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). More recently, Ryanair went beyond the regular baggage fee by 
charging passengers for the guarantee to bring cabin baggage on board the aircraft5 (Ryanair, 
2018). Alternatively, LCCs such as Southwest, have been diverging from the low-cost model 
by taking on a differentiation strategy by offering free checked bags. In a recent study, baggage 
fees were proven, despite having a negative impact on demand, to be beneficial, as they reduce 
fares and thus offset the effect of higher ticket prices on demand (Scotti & Dresner, 2015). 
9. No_gds. The Global Distribution System describes a computer reservation system that 
offers airlines access to sell tickets through third-party travel websites and travel agencies for a 
fee (Belobaba et al., 2016). Airlines use the GDS to expand their international reach and to 
penetrate the corporate market, as large corporations often use their own booking system or 
engage travel agencies for flight reservations (Sabre Airline Solutions Worldwide, 2010). As 
the costs for its usage are quite substantial, it is usually not inherent to the LCC model (Franke, 
2007). LCCs show mixed behavior regarding paying for access to the GDS. Whereas EasyJet 
already started to tap into the corporate market in 2007, Ryanair recently ended its GDS 
partnership (Ryanair, 2017; Sabre Airline Solutions Worldwide, 2016). 
10. Website Booking. Direct ticket bookings through the airline’s website are the primary 
distribution channel used by LCCs. Allowing passengers to only book tickets via their website 
poses two significant cost advantages for the airline. Airlines do not have to pay GDS fees and 
tickets can be directly (electronically) distributed to the customer (Doganis, 2006).  
11. No_FFP. Loyalty programs of airlines, commonly referred to as frequent-flyer 
programs were inherent only to the FSC model, as its introduction and operation increases costs 
                                                      
5 Ryanair restricts the amount of cabin baggage to 90 pieces per plane and charges €5 for a guaranteed 
space in the overhead compartment (Ryanair, 2018). 
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(Tomová & Ramajová, 2014). More and more LCCs are introducing FFPs, as part of a tit-for-
tat-strategy to imitate competitors and lock-in customers (Hvass, 2008).  
12. Fleet_uni. Fleet uniformity describes that airlines operate a fleet consisting of a single 
aircraft type or single aircraft family6. As outlined in the study by Alamdari & Fagan (2005), 
fleet uniformity based on the traditional LCC models is a major contributor to operational 
efficiency and poses financial benefits due to lower maintenance and overhead costs. Daft & 
Albers (2015) state that recently, FSCs have attempted to achieve operational efficiency similar 
to LCCs by adopting a uniform fleet on certain route networks. Contrary to this, LCCs are 
increasingly taking on a heterogeneous fleet to serve new route networks (Daft & Albers, 2015). 
A report by McKinsey&Company (2013) also shows that when a LCC adopts long-haul 
operations the airline loses fleet uniformity. This might have an impact on LCC profitability, 
as the cost advantage over FSCs gets diminished to only 13% from 30% to 50%. 
13. No_codeshare. Codeshare agreements are often interchangeably used with the term 
interlining; these agreements describe the passenger’s ability to book flights with partner 
airlines and connect through airports, without collecting and re-checking her/his baggage 
during the stopover (Belobaba et al., 2016). JetBlue already had 39 partner airlines in 2013 
(Jean & Lohmann, 2016). EasyJet recently announced that it would also collaborate with 
airlines to offer connecting flights to the US and Asia, thereby acting as a feeder airline to the 
main hubs (EasyJet, 2018; Vidović et al., 2013).  
14. Alliance. Similar to codeshare agreements, airline alliances offer synergies and benefits 
to its member airlines. Recently EasyJet, Ryanair, Norwegian, and Vueling joined the alliance 
Airlines for Europe with the objective of promoting interests of European passenger airlines 
(Airlines for Europe, 2018).  
3.5 Control Variables 
The research on innovation and BMs suggests that there are other meaningful determinants 
of firm performance. To control for an external effect of other time-variant variables that are 
related to the dependent variables, I include a series of control variables.  
                                                      
6 For example, the Airbus aircraft types A318, A319, A320, A321 all belong to the single-aisle A320 
family (Klophaus et al., 2012). 
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Following the Schumpeterian perspective about the effect of firm size on innovativeness, 
Stieglitz et al. (2007) point out that firm size has an impact on the chance and degree of 
innovation in a firm. Furthermore, the size of a firm determines how the innovative rents are 
appropriated in an organization, therefore having a potential impact on firm performance. In 
this study, not controlling for firm size would further lead to a biased result, as larger companies 
with high profits are incorrectly weighted compared to small companies with lower profits. No 
one single measurement of firm size exists within airline literature. More so, the size of an 
airline is expressed by different variables, such as customers served, the number of employees, 
market presence, passengers-flown, and fleet size (Hvass, 2008). However, some of the 
determinants of airline size are difficult to measure due to data availability. For this analysis, I 
consider two variables, fleet size at the year-end and passengers carried. The reasoning behind 
this choice is that the larger the firm, the more passengers are transported. Further, the larger 
the firm, the more routes and customers are served and, therefore, the more airplanes are 
needed. However, one potential shortcoming of measuring fleet size at the year-end is that one 
does not account for different aircraft types. Consequently, a carrier with large airplanes could 
be smaller than an airline with small planes regarding fleet size but have a higher total seat 
capacity. I, therefore, decided to control for firm size based on the number of passengers.  
The airline industry was further profoundly affected by the GFC in the years 2008 and 
2009 (Jean & Lohmann, 2016; Vidović et al., 2013). To control for economy-wide demand in 
passenger travel, I include year controls for the observation period (Collins et al., 2011). 
Additionally, I control for firm age in my models. As Johnson et al. (2008) outlined in their 
study, younger firms are more likely to adjust their BM often in their pursuit of profitability. 
As all monetary values were adjusted with the CPI of the airline’s respective country, I do not 
include any additional country-specific controls, such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth. 
Furthermore, airlines do not change their headquarters and are therefore based in the same 
country throughout the observation period. In order to follow a normal standard distribution, 
the variables “passenger” and “firm_age” were transformed with the natural logarithm to 
“log(passengers)” and “log(firm_age)”.  
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3.6 Research Design 
After having defined the dependent, independent and control variables, I construct the 
regression models to test my general research question. An observational study as presented in 
this paper poses considerable disadvantages compared to randomized experiments, due to the 
possibility of endogeneity caused by omitting variables (Allison, 2005). To circumvent this 
issue, I conduct a fixed effects regression analysis, thereby controlling for the unobserved time-
invariant factors ai (Wooldridge, 2013). As I want to investigate whether it is beneficial for 
airlines to change their BMs, I outline my two dependent variables “log_op_revi,c,t” and 
“op_margini,c,t” for each firm i, in a country j and year t. By analyzing both variables, I then 
investigate which BM specifications (independent variables) have the most significant impact 
on revenue. I also explain how this effect influences airline profitability. In the models, I focus 
on the following independent variables: “network”, “no_entertain”, “bag_fee”, “no_cargo”, 
“sing_class”, “no_gds”, “fleet_uni”. I thereby cover all three main components of the BM 
framework. The variables “log(passengers)” and “log(firm_age)”, serve as controls to single 
out the effect of other factors impacting the airline’s revenues and operating margin and are 
captured in 𝐸i,c,t. Finally, to further control for unobserved heterogeneity, I add a variable for 
year dummies, “YearControls”, to the model (Wooldridge, 2013). The fixed effects models are 
defined as: 
Model (1) 
log(𝑜𝑝_𝑟𝑒𝑣)i,c,t      
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑛𝑜_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑏𝑎𝑔_𝑓𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4(𝑛𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑜)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑛𝑜_𝑔𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7(𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑡_𝑢𝑛𝑖)𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾(𝐸)𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜚𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model (2)  
log(𝑜𝑝_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛)i,c,t
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1(𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑛𝑜_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑏𝑎𝑔_𝑓𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+   𝛽4(𝑛𝑜_𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑜)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝑛𝑜_𝑔𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡




A prevalent problem with regression analysis is multicollinearity (Kastalli & Van Looy, 
2013). However, as Kastalli & Van Looy (2013) state, it is difficult to test multicollinearity in 
a fixed effects model. First, I outline the correlation coefficients of all seven independent 
variables and two control variables in appendix III. None of the variables in the model show 
correlation that lies above the conventional levels of suspecting extreme serial correlation 
(Dormann et al., 2013). Furthermore, the variance inflation factors (VIF) were calculated using 
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator with the same independent and dummy variables 
as indicated in the models. The results in appendix IV show that the VIFs for the variables are 
below the threshold value of 10 (Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, I do not suspect 
multicollinearity in the model. To rule out another potential issue, heteroscedasticity, I 
conducted the Breusch-Pagan test (Wooldridge, 2013). As the p-value is close to zero, I reject 
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity and suspect heteroscedasticity in model (1). Therefore, 
I adjust the coefficients in model (1) with the robust standard errors (Arellano, 1987). The p-
value is not close to zero in model (2). Thus, I do not reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity as it seems that the model is not affected by heteroscedasticity7.   
                                                      







Airlines were further categorized based on the classification scheme8 by Vidović et al. 
(2013) described earlier, to outline the modifications and convergence in the industry at the 
beginning and end of the observation period. Table 4 illustrates the categorization and the 
changes of airline BMs. Across all airlines in the sample, the traditional BM adherence 
decreased from 79% in 2007 to 65% in 2016. According to the BM purity values, five airlines 
reduced their BM purity, whereas four airlines remained stagnant. Only Spirit Airlines reversed 
some of its changes and reverted to a more traditional LCC model. I conclude that the data I 
collected supports the literature on BM convergence in the airline industry.  
Table 4: Business Model Categorization Overview (2007, 2016) (Source: author’s own 
contribution) 
4.2 Regression Model Results 
To derive conclusions about the research question stated in this thesis, I subsequently 
analyze the models outlined in section 3.6. First, I show a general overview and description of 
the results of the two models. Next, I provide a more detailed summary and interpretation of 
the significant findings of the fixed effects models. Table 5 shows the results of the models 
with both dependent variables. Model (1) illustrates the fixed effects model with the dependent 
variable operating revenue, using the robust standard errors. Model (2) represents the fixed 
effects model with the dependent variable operating margin. The sample includes all 10 airlines 
for 10 years, therefore resulting in 100 observations. Each line of the independent variables 
displays the slope coefficients of all models. The standard errors are presented in parentheses 
                                                      
8 Purity Index Categorization as follows: Traditional LCC 100%, Real LCC > 80%, Hybrid LCC > 70%, 
Hybrid FSC > 30%, FSC ≤ 30%. 
Name (IATA code) Business Model 2007 Business Model 2016 Change 
JetBlue (B6) Hybrid FSC Hybrid FSC  
Flybe (BE) Hybrid FSC Hybrid FSC  
Norwegian (DY) Real LCC FSC  
Ryanair (FR) Traditional LCC Real LCC  
Allegiant Air (G4) Traditional LCC Real LCC  
Spirit (NK) Hybrid LCC Real LCC  
EasyJet (U2) Real LCC Hybrid LCC  
Vueling (VY) Real LCC Hybrid FSC  
Wizz Air (W6) Real LCC Real LCC  
Southwest (WN) Hybrid FSC Hybrid FSC  
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Model (1) shows that only three of the seven chosen BM specifications have a significant 
impact on the operating revenue. What is more, adhering to the traditional model more often 
has an adverse effect on the operating income than a positive impact. Only the variable 
“bag_fee” shows a significant positive effect on airline revenue. Not offering in-flight 
entertainment reduces the operating income significantly. Additionally, by adopting a uniform 
fleet, the coefficient significant at the 1% level shows that airlines experience a reduction in 
airline revenue. The coefficients of the variables “network”, “no_cargo” and “sing_class” all 
indicate an increase in revenues when adhering to the traditional model, however this effect is 
not statistically significant. Lastly, the coefficient of the variable “no_gds” shows that airlines 
that do not use the GDS have a lower revenue (not significant). After the initial analysis of 
model (1), it is not possible to derive an overall conclusion of whether LCCs should change 
their BM or not. By comparing these results to the coefficients of model (2), a more meaningful 
interpretation of the results is possible. My findings show that operating only a point-to-point 
Table 5: Regression Results (Source: author’s own contribution) 
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network does not have a statistically significant impact on profitability. The variable 
“no_entertain” shows that not only does the revenue decrease without complimentary in-flight 
entertainment, but also airline profitability. Although the variable “bag_fee” does affect airline 
revenues significantly, model (2) shows that charging for bags does not have a significant effect 
on profitability. Not transporting cargo, however, shows a positive impact on the operating 
margin (significant at the 10% level). The variable “sing_class” shows a similar positive result. 
Further, the variable “no_gds” does not significantly influence operating revenues. It does, 
however, decrease the operating margin significantly. A reverse effect is noticeable for the 
variable “fleet_uni”. Operating a uniform fleet has a significant adverse effect on operating 
revenue, but does not have a significant impact on the operating margin.  
The coefficient of the control variable “log(firm_age)” shows that the age of the airline 
does not significantly affect revenues, but has a significant impact on profitability. These 
findings are in line with the research outlined above, as younger firms are still adjusting their 
operations to reach the efficiency of incumbents. The variable “log(passengers)” has a 
significant effect on airline revenues. These results are in line with economic theory, as 
transporting more passengers most likely leads to higher revenues. Nonetheless, a higher 
passenger number does not allow for conclusions about the profitability of an airline, as shown 
in model (2).  
The adjusted R2 for model (1) shows that the variance of the independent variables explains 
95.4% of the variance in the dependent variable "log_op_rev". The adjusted R2 for model (2) 
shows that the variance of the independent variables explains 53.3% of the variance in the 
dependent variable "op_margin". In the following sections, I will discuss the significant 
coefficients of both models in more detail. 
4.2.1 Discussion of Results: In-flight Entertainment 
According to model (1), not offering free in-flight entertainment reduces the operating 
revenue of airlines, ceteris paribus, by 13.4%9 on average. The coefficient is significant at the 
5% level. Model (2) also shows an adverse effect; a lack of complimentary in-flight 
entertainment reduces the operating margin, ceteris paribus, by 5.0 percentage points on 
average. This effect is significant at the 5% level. In the data sample, only JetBlue offers free 
in-flight entertainment throughout the entire observation period, as shown in appendix IX. Two 
                                                      
9 Log-level model: The coefficient is calculated in the following way: 100*(e-0.144) -1) = -13.4%. 
 
 28 
airlines, Norwegian and Southwest, changed from not offering free in-flight entertainment to 
offering complimentary in-flight entertainment. The benefits of this convergence trend are not 
only supported by the results of the fixed effects model, but recent literature also suggests that 
charging for services such as entertainment or food reduces customer satisfaction (Tuzovic et 
al., 2014). The authors point out that introducing additional fees in addition to the ticket price 
can result in the feeling of betrayal and anger for the consumer. Customers could potentially 
retaliate against the airline, at the extreme, by entirely avoiding the brand. As shown in the 
model, this effect has a potentially substantial impact on revenues and further affects the 
operating margin. As Alamdari & Fagan (2005) state, offering complimentary services is 
increasingly common across American LCCs; nonetheless, the study suggests that airlines are 
not achieving a price premium by including complementary services. It is not possible to prove 
with this thesis whether airlines in this sample can obtain a price premium. Even if they are not 
able to do so, they are superior at retaining customers due to the psychological effect outlined 
above. Compared to historically-used in-flight entertainment with seatback screens, the 
introduction and maintenance cost of complimentary Wi-Fi is much lower (Deloitte, 2017; 
Fitchard, 2015). Nowadays, passengers can use their own devices and connect to in-flight Wi-
Fi with free access to videos and music on Norwegian and JetBlue flights. It can be concluded 
that the results in model (1) and (2) suggest that the benefits of adding complimentary onboard 
entertainment (in the form of Wi-Fi) are higher than the associated cost of its introduction and 
operation. 
4.2.2 Discussion of Results: Baggage Fees 
Charging for a checked bag seems to significantly increase revenues on average, ceteris 
paribus by 13.7%10. However, model (2) does not show a significant effect of charging for 
baggage on the operating margin. Therefore, I conclude that charging a fee for checked bags is 
generally beneficial for airline revenues. Nevertheless, it seems that most of this benefit is not 
transferred to airline profitability. My results support the findings of a study by Scotti & Dresner 
(2015) which highlights that unbundling airfares and baggage fees is beneficial for airline 
revenues. As the authors state, unbundling the fare and baggage fee results on average in only 
a $0.11 lower fare for every $1 increase in baggage fees. Further, the passenger reduction for 
                                                      
10 100*((e0.128) -1) = 13.7% 
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every $1 increase in ticket prices is nine times higher than the passenger reduction of $1 
increase in baggage fees (Scotti & Dresner, 2015).  
All airlines in the investigated data sample in this thesis, except for Southwest, charged a 
fee for checked luggage in 2016 (see appendix X). JetBlue, which previously included 
baggage, changed to an unbundling strategy in 2013. One can see that the trend towards 
charging bag fees is characteristic of the traditional LCC model, despite the increasing 
hybridization of BM characteristics. However, my analysis suggests that the revenue gain does 
not necessarily translate into a higher operating margin. I find empirical evidence for the 
suggestion for further research raised by Scotti & Dresner (2015) about the impact that baggage 
fees have on airline success. While it seems that checked bags can increase airline revenues 
quite substantially, a possible explanation is that passengers bring more cabin luggage instead 
of paying for checked bags. This thereby leads to congestion during the boarding process, 
increasing turnaround times and flight delays (Scotti & Dresner, 2015). The recent introduction 
of a fee for cabin baggage by Ryanair (Ryanair, 2018) could mitigate this issue and increase 
airline profitability. 
4.2.3 Discussion of Results: Cargo Transportation 
The results show that whether an LCC is carrying cargo or not does not significantly 
influence the airline’s revenue. Not transporting cargo, however, increases the operating margin 
of an airline, ceteris paribus, by 5.4 percentage points on average (significant at the 10% level). 
The literature pointed out earlier supports this result; freight transportation increases costs and 
decreases aircraft utilization. An overview of the changes in cargo transportation is given in 
appendix XI. A glance at the data sample shows that whereas JetBlue stopped carrying cargo, 
Vueling recently added cargo operations. A report by McKinsey&Company (2013) suggests 
that on long-haul flights, cargo can increase the airline’s revenue by 5-20% per flight. However, 
according to the regression model, this proposition is not supported for short-haul flights11. I 
conclude that revenue gains are only marginal, as fewer passenger flights can be conducted due 
to the cargo loading and unloading activities. Even though the coefficient in model (1) suggests 
such a result, a valid conclusion cannot be derived12, as it is not significant and has a high 
standard error. Since the associated costs of introducing cargo transportation and operational 
                                                      
11 All airlines in the data sample, except for Norwegian, exclusively operate short-haul flights. 
12 The coefficient = .062 (not significant) and the standard error = .058. 
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efficiency loss negatively impact the profitability, thereby offsetting any potential revenue gain, 
cargo activities are not beneficial to the LCCs business.  
4.2.4 Discussion of Results: Cabin Set-up 
During the observation period, JetBlue and Norwegian changed from a single-class cabin 
with only economy seats to a mixed-class cabin set-up, by adding business class seats. Spirit 
Airlines, on the contrary, abandoned its mixed-class and has been operating a single-class cabin 
since 2013. An overview of the changes is given in appendix XII. Model (1) does not show 
any significant impact of a single-class on revenues, nevertheless the model suggests a slight 
increase in revenue with a single-class cabin set-up. Airlines with a single-class cabin achieve 
higher revenues by having a higher seating density, as well as a greater aircraft utilization due 
to faster turnaround times. However, LCCs with differentiated classes can potentially achieve 
a higher per seat revenue. Model (2) illustrates that operating a single-class cabin, ceteris 
paribus, increases the operating margin by 9.6 percentage points on average, significant at the 
1% level. As outlined above, the operating costs per passenger are lower with a single-class 
cabin. Further, the model suggests that the potential revenue gain of a mixed-class cabin is 
offset by the higher seating density of a single-class aircraft. Overall, whereas revenues remain 
mostly unaffected, it can be concluded that the single-class cabin set-up is more profitable for 
LCCs.  
4.2.5 Discussion of Results: Global Distribution System 
As shown in the appendix XIII, only five airlines distributed their tickets via the GDS in 
2007. Moreover, Allegiant Air was the only airline not part of the GDS network in 2016. Many 
airlines justify the high fees of the GDS with the access to a new customer segment, the 
corporate market, and a greater international reach (Sabre Airline Solutions Worldwide, 2010). 
Therefore, it is possible that revenues could increase by integrating the GDS. Model (1) 
supports this effect, however the coefficient is not significant. Therefore, it cannot be concluded 
whether it is beneficial for an airline to distribute tickets through the GDS or not. While the 
effect on revenues is not significant, not being a member of the GDS has a significant negative 
impact on the operating margin. The margin is, ceteris paribus, on average 4.6 percentage points 
lower. This effect is significant at the 5% level. This is different from the expected result that 
the GDS would increase revenues substantially, but only slightly increase the operating margin, 
due to the high fees for ticket distribution, which can account for up to 17% of operating cost 
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(Alamdari & Fagan, 2005). Thus, it seems that reduced GDS fees made it more attractive for 
airlines to use the system. 
4.2.6 Discussion of Results: Fleet Uniformity 
Southwest Airlines has been operating a fleet solely consisting of Boeing 737s for a 
sustained period. When Southwest took over the regional airline AirTran in 2011, the company 
faced a challenge of how to integrate 88 Boeing 717s from the takeover (Southwest Airlines, 
2011). As operating different aircraft types would lead to higher costs, the airline decided to 
sell the planes to a competitor within the next three years. By doing so, Southwest could 
maintain the cost advantage of operating a single-type fleet. The fleet type changes of all 
airlines in the data sample are outlined in appendix XIV. The results of the models support the 
behavior of Southwest Airlines. Whereas airlines with a homogenous fleet, ceteris paribus, have 
a significantly lower revenue of 6.6%13 compared to airlines with a mixed fleet, the profitability 
remains mostly unaffected. Even though LCCs with a heterogeneous fleet, such as Norwegian, 
might generate higher revenues by flying to long-haul destinations with its new Boeing 757s, 
in addition to their short-haul flights, the higher costs offset the revenue increase. A possible 
limitation of the analysis of fleet uniformity is that a sufficiently large airline could derive 
similar benefits even though the airline operates a mixed fleet. As long as the route network for 
a single aircraft type is large enough, the company will benefit from economies of scale 
(Klophaus et al., 2012).  
4.2.7 Further Discussion 
All significant findings in this thesis, except for the effect of the GDS, are supported in 
previous studies. Surprisingly, the choice of network does not have a significant impact on 
airline revenues or profits. Due to the few changes of the variable “network” in the data sample, 
this seems to be reasonable (see appendix XV). At the end of the observation period, five 
airlines operate a pure point-to-point system, whereas the other five blend their hub-and-spoke 
system with point-to-point operations. As outlined earlier, both systems have their cost 
advantages. Moreover, as research by Pels (2008) suggests, the benefits of both systems are 
highly dependent on competition, as well as customer demand and their willingness to pay on 
these routes.  
                                                      
13 Log-level model: 100*(e-0.068) -1) = -6.6% 
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Based on my findings, airline management should consider the cost advantage of not 
transporting cargo when solely operating short-haul flights. I further suggest that free in-flight 
entertainment, especially in the form of free Wi-Fi access, could result in higher profitability, 
due to the positive psychological effect and low introduction cost. Further studies should 
investigate whether the introduction of such services leads to a price-premium, as well as their 
cost implications in more detail. Charging for checked baggage could be beneficial, as a direct 
increase in revenues is noticeable. Nonetheless, as the revenue gain is not necessarily 
transferred to profits, the causality effect might be hidden from airline management. Ryanair 
was one of the first airlines to take measures against the fact that the revenue gain is lost due to 
a decrease in operational efficiency. However, by introducing a fee for carry-on luggage, this 
might cause other potential issues regarding customer demand and negative associations with 
the brand similar to the ones raised in the study by Tuzovic et al. (2014). Future studies should 
analyze the positive effect of using the GDS on profitability in more detail and investigate 
whether GDS providers decreased their fees over time. Lastly, consistent with existing research, 
this thesis suggests that operating a uniform fleet is more cost efficient. Nevertheless, the 
revenue gain by operating a mixed fleet offsets this benefit.  
As Alamdari & Fagan (2005) already pointed out over a decade ago, airlines increase the 
capability of keeping costs low by adhering to the original LCC model. Whenever airline 
managers consider changes based on the results of this study, they should take into account the 
cost implication of the change, the individual market conditions, the potential of achieving a 
competitive advantage, and the speed by which competitors can imitate the changes (Alamdari 
& Fagan, 2005).  
 
 33 
5 Conclusion  
The BM convergence in the aviation industry is slowly becoming an increasingly 
interesting topic for scholars and practitioners. However, the impact on airline profitability has 
not been examined in detail. This thesis is a first attempt to assess how changes of distinct LCC 
BM specifications affect airline profitability. Overall, my findings indicate that adhering to the 
more traditional LCC model can positively impact airline profitability. Nevertheless, a 
departure from the traditional model can also be beneficial in specific areas. Therefore, it seems 
that blending aspects of both the LCC and FSC model (a hybridization of business models) is 
the best option for airlines. The study suggests that an airline that offers free-of-charge in-flight 
entertainment, no cargo transportation, a single-class cabin, and uses the GDS system achieves 
the highest profitability. 
The study also presents some limitations that highlight the need for further research on this 
topic. The aforementioned endogeneity problems of an observational study cannot be 
eliminated entirely (Allison, 2005; Wooldridge, 2013). First of all, the selection bias cannot be 
fully ruled out, as the LCCs in this study are categorized by two different governmental bodies. 
The challenging part is not only finding a reliable source that classifies airlines across countries, 
but also gathering enough publicly available data on these airlines. Even though a study solely 
based on publicly accessible data in the airline industry is already a challenge, it would be 
beneficial for the analyst to further enlarge the data sample. Some of the variables included 
indicate only little variation throughout the observation period. Therefore, some events might 
have too much influence on the coefficients and reduce the statistical significance of the results. 
If other studies with more extensive data samples confirm the findings, the results would be 
more reliable. Furthermore, I also suggest to investigate other economic regions (such as Asia 
or the Middle East) to generate an understanding of how BM changes affect airline profitability 
in different markets and stages of market development. Studies should be frequently updated 
as the industry is in constant motion and growing similarity of BMs could erode the benefits of 
blending aspects for airlines (Daft & Albers, 2015).  
In this study, qualitative and quantitative information were transformed into binary 
variables, thereby risking the loss of valuable information stored in the data. Although this 
transformation supported data comparison across the airlines in the sample, further studies 
should find a way of creating more meaningful variables. This could also reduce the effect of 
multicollinearity, which limited the efficiency of the applied models and variables included in 
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this thesis. Another potential issue with utilizing dummy variables was that I could not account 
for the degree of service level included in the variables. For instance, what exactly defines 
complimentary catering; free premium snacks or a complimentary meal? Furthermore, it is 
possible that there are omitted time-variant variables that influence how airlines transfer 
revenues into profits, such as managerial experience. Collecting additional data about airline 
management by utilizing surveys could help to eliminate such biases. Lastly, studies could also 
consider the fact that some BM changes lag instead of being directly transferred into revenues 
or profits. For instance, the introduction of a FFP incurs high costs immediately, but might only 
show a higher revenue and profit margin after a critical mass of customers makes use of it. 
Despite these limitations, this study is relevant for scholars and policy makers. Through 
the construction of a measurement variable for business model convergence from all the 
variables in the dataset, I added a more recent study sample to the literature about BM 
convergence in the airline industry. My findings support the general belief among scholars 
about increasing BM convergence and show a decline in adherence to the traditional LCC 
model. I believe in the importance of such updates to create awareness on the convergence trend 
in general and to follow its development. Furthermore, even though the results do not allow for 
decisive recommendations to airlines yet, I hope to create awareness about how changes could 
affect airlines’ revenues and the operating margin, and stimulate further research in this area. 
As Chesbrough (2010) already pointed out, an important part of BMI is to understand the 
potential value benefit resulting from changing specifications of the old BM or switching to a 
new model. This is especially important when considering the fact that the demand for 
passenger mobility will increase substantially over the decades to come. This trend will bring 
increasing competition to the airline industry, which will make it more difficult for incumbents 
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Towards a means of 
consistently comparing 
airline business models 
with an application to the 
'low cost' airline sector 
Develop Product and Organizational 
Architecture framework to outline 









Low cost carriers going 
hybrid: Evidence from 
Europe 
Create index if carrier follows 
archetypical LCC business model or 
changed towards a hybrid model based on 
survey. 
20 European 







The business model 
spectrum 
Map and summarize BM specifications 
based on Product and Organizational 
Architecture framework. Outline the 
emergence of hybrid models. 








Revisiting the airline 
business model spectrum 
Similar to Lohmann & Koo (2013); 
Compares both studies. 







Development of Business 
Models of Low-Cost 
Airlines 
Analysis of Business Model aspects of 











A conceptual framework 
for measuring airline 
business model 
convergence 
Developing a LCC business model 
framework illustrating certain business 
model specifications which is then applied 









An empirical analysis of 
airline business model 
convergence 
Uses BM framework from 2013 study, 
Gower coefficient to measure distance and 
calculate differentiation levels among BM 
of these airlines. Longitudinal research 











Impact of the adherence to 
the original low-cost model 
on the profitability of low-
cost airlines 
Analysis of 10 LCCs and evaluation 
against traditional Southwest model, use 
spearman’s rank to outline relationship 
between adherence to the original model 
and profitability. 






A Boolean Approach to 
Airline Business Model 
Innovation 
Boolean minimization algorithm to 
identify which combinations of business 
model activities lead to operational 
profitability. 




Appendix II: Variable Operationalization Approach (Source: author’s own contribution, approach adapted from Soyk et al. (2017)) 
General framework Airline-Industry Framework 
Main Components and 
Subcategories by Teece 
(2018) 
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(2012) 
Components from 
Daft & Albers (2015) 
Components from 





Items based on 
Traditional LCC 
definition from (Belobaba 
et al., 2016; Hunter, 2006) 
Items based on FSC 
definition from 
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with which you want to address 
customer needs 
Type of air product, 
Route network, Cabin 
product, Ground product 
Profitability index, 
Airport index 




No in-flight entertainment, 






The customers and their needs 









No air cargo 
Mixed cabin 
Air cargo transportation 
Geography The countries and areas you 
want to do business in 
 
Geographic focus Connectivity index Geographic focus Short haul Short- and long-haul 
Revenue 
Model 
Pricing Logic The general pricing logic 
applicable and suitable given 
clients, products, value creation 
and interaction 
Fare structure Revenue index Fare structure Cheap-one way fares, 
Baggage-fee 
Complex ticketing 
Channels The channels through which the 
interaction is facilitated and the 
value delivered in the best way 




Online and direct booking Mainly through travel 




The base and way of the 
interaction with the client 
Distribution, Advertising N/A Distribution, 
Advertising 
No loyalty programs Use of frequent-flyer 
programs (collect & redeem 
miles) 
 
Cost Model Core Assets & 
Capabilities 
The core assets and capabilities 
required for value creation 
Fleet structure, 
Infrastructure, Human 
capital, Property capital, 
Input factor policy, 
Executive ownership 
Labour index, Cost 
drivers, Aircraft index 
Fleet structure, 
Input factor policy 
Fleet uniformity, 
High aircraft utilization 
Mixed fleet 
Low aircraft utilization 
Core Activities The specific activities and 
processes that link assets and 
partners in value creation and 
which need to be mastered 
Supply Management, 
Finance Management 





The depth and breadth of the 
partner network ideal for 









Connecting flights, Baggage 
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